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Abstract 
Information plays a major role in any moral action. ICT (Information and 
Communication Technologies) have revolutionized the life of information, from its 
production and management to its consumption, thus deeply affecting our moral lives. 
Amid the many issues they have raised, a very serious one, discussed in this paper, is 
labelled the tragedy of the Good Will. This is represented by the increasing pressure that 
ICT and their deluge of information are putting on any agent who would like to act 
morally, when informed about actual or potential evils, but who also lacks the resources 
to do much about them. In the paper, it is argued that the tragedy may be at least 
mitigated, if not solved, by seeking to re-establish some equilibrium, through ICT 
themselves, between what agents know about the world and what they can do to 
improve it. 
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Introduction: The Moral Values of Information 
ICT affect an agent’s moral life in many ways. Recently,1 I suggested that these may be 
schematically organized along three lines (see Figure 1).  
Suppose our agent A is interested in pursuing whatever she considers her best 
course of action, given her predicament. She is embodied and embedded, as an 
informational agent, in an equally informational environment, to which we may refer as 
the infosphere.2 We shall assume that A’s evaluations and interactions have some moral 
value, but no specific value needs to be introduced at this stage. Intuitively, A can avail 
herself of some information (information as a resource) to generate some other 
information (information as a product) and, in so doing, affect her informational 
environment (information as target). 
The scheme in Figure 1 may help one to get some initial orientation in the 
multiplicity of issues belonging to Information Ethics.3 It is also useful to explain why 
any technology that radically modifies the “life of information” is bound to have 
profound moral implications. Moral life is a highly information-intensive activity and 
ICT, by radically transforming the informational context in which moral issues arise, 
                                                 
1 Luciano Floridi. Information Ethics, Its Nature and Scope. In Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert, 
editors, Moral Philosophy and Information Technology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
forthcoming. 
2 Infosphere is a neologism I coined years ago (see for example Luciano Floridi. Philosophy and 
Computing: An Introduction. Routledge London, New York, 1999.) on the basis of “biosphere”, a term 
referring to that limited region on our planet that supports life. It denotes the whole informational 
environment constituted by all informational entities (thus including informational agents as well), their 
properties, interactions, processes and mutual relations. It is an environment comparable to, but different 
from cyberspace (which is only one of its sub-regions, as it were), since it also includes off-line and 
analogue spaces of information. 
3 The interested reader may find a detailed analysis of the model in Floridi. Information Ethics, Its Nature 
and Scope.  
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not only add interesting new dimensions to old problems, but lead us to rethink, 
methodologically, the very grounds on which our ethical positions are based.4  
 
 
A
infosphere
info-target 
info-resource 
info-product 
Figure 1. The Agent Embedded in the Infosphere 
 
At the same time, the previous analysis rectifies an excessive emphasis occasionally 
placed on specific technologies (this happens most notably in computer ethics), by 
calling our attention to the more fundamental phenomenon of information in all its 
varieties and long tradition. This was also Wiener’s position5 and the various difficulties 
                                                 
4 For a similar position in computer ethics see Walter Maner. Unique Ethical Problems in Information 
Technology. Science and Engineering Ethics, 2(2): 137-154, 1996. On the so-called “uniqueness debate” 
see Luciano Floridi, and Jeff Sanders. Mapping the Foundationalist Debate in Computer Ethics. Ethics 
and Information Technology, 4(1): 1-9, 2002. Herman T. Tavani. The Uniqueness Debate in Computer 
Ethics: What Exactly Is at Issue, and Why Does It Matter? Ethics and Information Technology, 4(1): 37-
54, 2002. 
5 The classic reference here is to Norbert Wiener. The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and 
Society, Rev. Ed. Houghton Mifflin Boston, 1954. Terrell Bynum. Computer Ethics: Basic Concepts and 
Historical Overview. In Edward N. Zalta, editors, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2001. has 
convincingly argued that Wiener may be considered one of the founding fathers of information ethics.  
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encountered in the conceptual foundations of computer ethics are arguably6 connected 
to the fact that the latter has not yet been recognized as primarily an environmental 
ethics, whose main concern is (or should be) the ecological management and well-being 
of the infosphere.  
 Returning to the ways in which ICT affect an agent’s moral life, in this paper I 
shall not be concerned with ontological issues (the third arrow in Figure 1, to simplify) 
but rather with the identification and solution of a key problem that arises in the context 
of the first two “arrows” in our model, namely when information is taken in a semantic 
sense, as a resource and a product. I shall refer to the problem as the tragedy of the 
Good Will.  
The problem is simple, but making it explicit and precise, as well as suggesting 
some fruitful strategies for tackling it, will require careful analysis. This will be the goal 
of the next two sections. I hope the reader will bear with me while I make explicit a few 
simple assumptions and then outline an interpretation of the tragic and the scandalous. 
 
Six Assumptions 
Our first assumption has already surfaced, so let me make it fully visible: 
1) “information” will be used here in its strongly semantic sense, in order to refer to 
syntactically well-formed, semantically meaningful and veridical data, like “Paris is the 
capital of France” or “the train to London leaves at 11 am”. So we shall not be 
concerned with information in the probabilistic sense (Shannon’s theory), in the 
structural sense (consider the local and global information that help one to solve 
                                                 
6 Luciano Floridi. Information Ethics: On the Philosophical Foundations of Computer Ethics. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 1(1): 37-56, 1999. 
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crosswords or sudoku problems), in the ontological sense, especially as natural patterns 
(e.g. the DNA) or in the instructional sense (e.g. an algorithm).  
Moral evaluations and actions have an informational component in the semantic 
sense just introduced. This component is crucial, since A may be expected to proceed 
“to the best of her information”, availing herself of whatever information she can 
muster, in order to reach (better) conclusions about what can and ought to be done in 
some given circumstances. This is our second, Aristotelian assumption: 
2) our moral agent A is interested in gaining as much relevant information as required 
by the circumstances, or, as Aristotle puts it at the beginning of his Metaphysics, we 
shall assume that “all men by nature desire to know”. This may be for evolutionary 
reasons (one naturalistic way of reading Aristotle’s “by nature”) or because well-
informed agents are more likely to do the right thing (a Socratic way of reading 
Aristotle’s “by nature”). One can accept the assumption without necessarily embracing 
the ensuing ethical naturalism or intellectualism (which analyses evil and morally 
wrong behaviour as the outcome of deficient information). 
 Our third assumption concerns A’s limited powers: 
3) A does not have boundless resources but is realistically constrained, especially by 
time, memory (i.e., amount of information storable and available), energy expendable to 
increase her information and capacities to handle it. This is not as bad as it looks. As is 
well known, moral action cannot presuppose any form of omnipotence. So one of the 
axioms of Standard Deontic Logic requires that, if it ought to be that a, then it is 
 6
permissible that a (Oa → Pa), which in our context means that, if A must do a then A 
can do a.7
The previous condition goes some way towards mitigating the impact of our 
next assumption: 
4) A’s moral responsibility tends to be directly proportional to A’s degree of 
information, any decrease in the latter usually corresponding to a decrease in the former. 
This is the important sense in which information may occur in the guise of judicial 
evidence, for example. It is also the sense in which one speaks of A’s informed decision, 
informed consent, or well-informed participation. The assumption also allows 
counterfactual evaluations: had A been properly informed A would have acted 
differently and hence would not have made the moral mistake that she made.  
5) no akrasia. We shall assume that our agent A is capable of carrying out the course of 
action that she judges to be morally best. Although not very realistic (the practicing vs. 
preaching dichotomy is common to the point of being proverbial), this assumption is 
still plausible and it merely satisfies a simplicity requirement. A’s lack of akrasia means 
that A does not act against her judgment, but here it is not taken to mean that A has an 
intrinsic desire to act morally. For this anti-Hobbesian motivation, we need a last 
assumption: 
6) eudokia. This Greek word means “good will”, an expression made famous by the 
Vulgata version of Luke 2.14 (“pax hominibus bonae voluntatis” “peace to all men of 
good will”). It is in this original sense of benevolent attitude, or a willingness/desire to 
                                                 
7 On the connection between epistemic and deontic logic see now Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh, and Eva 
Cogan. The Logic of Knowledge Based Obligation. Synthese, 149(2): 57-87, 2006. 
 7
do the right thing, that it is going to be used in this article.8 This use of “Good Will” is 
eccentric with respect to Kant’s well-known interpretation. According to Kant, a good 
will is the only thing that “can be taken as good without qualification”. Its decisions are 
entirely dictated by moral demands, that is, by the moral law. In this paper, the Good 
Will overlaps with Kant’s description deontologically, insofar as she (I use “it” to refer 
to Kant’s conception) is identified as a privileged centre of morally good action. On the 
other hand, the God Will differs partly from Kant’s description in a way that may be 
defined as “care-ethically”, that is, insofar as she includes not only a purely rational but 
also a caring attitude. Our Good Will is expected to exhibit a willingness to engage with 
the world for its own sake and an attentiveness to (that is, interest in, concern with, and 
compassion for) its well-being. Both attitudes are extraneous to Kant’s conception, as 
each requires an emotional and emphatic involvement. In our case, the rational and 
caring attitudes are supposed to be complementary and to add value to each other.  
 To summarize, we shall assume that A is a Good Will, endowed with some but 
limited resources, who bases her decisions and actions on the proper management of her 
information about the world, who is reasonably capable of implementing whatever she 
thinks ought to be done morally, whose responsibilities increase with the amount of 
information she enjoys (and who knows that this is so), and who is motivated by a 
genuine desire to know and by a sincere eudokia, while not suffering from akrasia. For 
the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to this type of agent as the Good Will.  
                                                 
8 The reader should be warned that the discussion about the proper reading of the passage is a scholarly 
battlefield. Depending on whether one adds an “s” at the end of eudokia and make it a genitive, the 
reading changes from “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men” – which is 
the classic reading (but note that the good will in question is God’s, not men’s) – to “Glory to God in the 
highest, and peace among men in whom he is well pleased”, which has strong Calvinist implications in 
favour of the predestined. Either way, the Vulgata seems a misleading translation, if suggestive. 
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The Good Will is an ideal but not an idealized agent. As in any scientific 
experiment in which one tries to abstract from irrelevant details and obtain ideal 
conditions (e.g. by referring to frictionless models in dynamic experiments), we can use 
the Good Will to bring to light and properly formulate an important problem caused by 
ICT. But first, one last round of clarifications, as promised. 
 
The Tragic and the Scandalous 
To understand the tragedy of the Good Will we need to appreciate what the tragic 
means. The suggestion developed in this section is that the tragic arises from a lack of 
balance between information and power in the presence of eudokia, i.e. of a Good 
Will’s (the agent’s) inclination to act morally. “Power” refers to the bounded skills, 
resources, means, etc. needed to implement a morally good action (see point 3 above). 
“Information” refers to how much (or little) the Good Will knows about the world, 
including past events, current circumstances and future implications or effects (see point 
1 above). Without eudokia there is no sense of the tragic, but the presence of eudokia is 
insufficient to give rise to the tragic, since the Good Will might actually succeed in her 
endeavours. For the tragic to arise, there also needs to be a fundamental lack of balance. 
A few classic examples will help to clarify the point. 
1) Lucretius: no Good Will, no tragedy.  
Lucretius in his De Rerum Natura (Book II, Proem) provides a beautiful illustration of 
information without either Good Will or power: “Tis sweet, when, down the mighty 
main, the winds / Roll up its waste of waters, from the land / To watch another's 
labouring anguish far, / Not that we joyously delight that man / Should thus be smitten, 
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but because 'tis sweet / To mark what evils we ourselves be spared [...]”. Lucretius is 
presenting here the detached and content ataraxia to be developed by the philosophical 
mind. If there is a lack of involvement (apathia) and Good Will – in this case a desire to 
help and intervene – then it is not tragic but sweet to witness someone else’s anguish, 
for the struggle is only in the object observed, and not in the observer. Compare this to 
the following, equally famous scene of shipwrecking.  
2) Miranda: the tragic as a result of Good Will, Information and Power.  
When in The Tempest (Act I, Scene II) Shakespeare describes Miranda watching from 
afar the apparent sinking of “a brave vessel”, he makes her utter the following words 
(emphasis added): “If by your art, my dearest father, you have / Put the wild waters in 
this roar, allay them. / The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch, / But that the 
sea, mounting to the welkin's cheek, / Dashes the fire out. O, I have suffered/ With those 
that I saw suffer: a brave vessel, / Who had, no doubt, some noble creature in her, / 
Dash'd all to pieces. O, the cry did knock / Against my very heart. Poor souls, they 
perish'd. / Had I been any god of power, I would / Have sunk the sea within the earth or 
ere / It should the good ship so have swallow'd and / The fraughting souls within her.” 
Two points deserve our attention.  
First, both Lucretius and Miranda may be assumed to be witnessing the same 
disaster. But Miranda is a Good Will (“I have suffered with those that I saw suffer”). 
Her eudokia makes her wish she were able to match her alleged information (in fact, it 
will turn out that no “noble creature” is “dashed to pieces”) with some equal power, 
which, in this case, would require a god-like (demiurgic, more on this later) degree of 
control over the elements (“had I been any god of power I would have sunk the sea 
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within the earth”). She knows that the tragic would disappear if only her (the Good 
Will’s) power were equal to her information.  
The second point is that the tragic will indeed later vanish when Miranda/the 
Good Will realizes that she was misinformed. So we, readers and audience, are 
confronted by a lack of balance between power and information that can be restored 
either by making the former match the latter (what Miranda would like to do), or by 
making the latter match the former (what in fact will happen). Such a lack of balance, as 
the essence of the tragic, is openly evident in Oedipus and Cassandra. 
3) Oedipus: the tragic as a result of Good Will, Power and Lack of Information. 
On the one hand, Oedipus has only some limited information about his horrific future 
(he is told that he will kill his father and marry his mother) but lacks the relevant 
information (he was adopted; the man he kills on his journey is his real father; the 
woman he later marries is his real mother). On the other hand, Oedipus has quite a lot of 
power to implement his eudokia and try to avoid his destiny (he leaves his home town 
and those whom he believes to be his parents, thus hoping to escape his destiny; he later 
becomes king). It is because Oedipus is a Good Will that his fate is tragic. But his 
tragedy is entirely informational: his desire to do the right thing is combined with the 
(royal) power to carry over his decisions but also with the wrong sort of information. So 
it is not accidental that Oedipus becomes king of Thebes (marrying his mother Jocasta) 
through an informational rite of passage, by answering the riddle of the Sphinx; that it is 
a blind source who sees better than him (the seer Teiresias) who reveals to Oedipus his 
real fate; and that Oedipus, in the end, punishes himself by forcing his mother’s brooch 
pins into his eyes. Greek epistemology is very visual, being informed is seeing.  
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Our last example is equally classic, but shows a lack of balance in terms of lack 
of power, not of information. 
4) Cassandra: the tragic as a result of Good Will, Information but Lack of Power. 
Cassandra can predict (“hear”) the future, a gift from Apollo, but is also cursed by the 
same god, so that her predictions will never be believed. This is a source of endless 
frustration and pain, as nobody acts on her accurate warnings. She is the Good Will that 
has all the necessary information (about the Trojan Horse and Troy’s destruction; or 
about Agamemnon’s and her murder) but who is powerless when it comes to avoiding 
the foreseen events. 
To summarize: the tragic occurs in the presence of a Good Will (Miranda), when 
she is sufficiently powerful but insufficiently informed (Oedipus), or sufficiently 
informed but insufficiently powerful (Cassandra). Since the tragic is due to a lack of 
balance, and any balance is a matter of fine tuning, the risk of the tragic in either form is 
constant. When the tragic occurs, it is a scandal.  
The scandalous is how the tragic may be perceived by its observers. Oedipus’ 
and Cassandra’s tragic predicaments are scandalous not because they set bad examples 
(for nobody would follow them), but because they show to the observers the ultimate, 
titanic failure of the Good Will. In a context in which the essence of agenthood is 
largely constituted by its eudokia, the agent who “gives scandal” has, by the same 
token, annihilated her essence, and thus ceased to be an agent altogether. For the Good 
Will, giving scandal is tantamount to committing suicide or being terminated. This is 
how one may interpret the famous quote from the Matthew’s Gospel: “He that shall 
scandalize one of these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill-
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stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of 
the sea.” (Mt. 18:6, emphasis added). In the desperate sea of Miranda, that is, not of 
Lucretius. 
We are finally ready to analyse the relation between ICT, the tragic and the 
scandalous. 
 
The Twofold Relation between ICT and the Tragic 
Given the forms in which the tragic (and hence the scandalous) may occur, it is not 
surprising that the relation between the informational revolution, brought about by ICT, 
and the tragic, might be twofold. 
On the one hand, we have what I have labelled elsewhere the IT-heodicean 
problem.9 New or digital ICTs provide the Good Will with increasing opportunities – 
directly or indirectly, from nanotechnology to risk assessment modelling, from 
bioinformatics to neuroscience, from genetic engineering to telemedicine and so forth – 
to prevent, defuse, control or eradicate evil. Information is power, as we all know. It 
follows that, the more powerful the Good Will becomes – in terms of science and 
technology and ICT in particular – the wider becomes the scope of her responsibilities 
for what is within her power to influence is. Thus, ICT greatly contribute to the 
increasing moral pressure put on the Good Will and her insufficient information about 
what ought to be done. It is as if the Good Will had the means to do something for the 
welfare of the world, but did not see how. Like Oedipus, when evil finally occurs, the 
                                                 
9 The theodicean debate concerns whether it is possible to reconcile the existence of God and the presence 
of evil; the IT-heodicean debate concerns the problem of artificial evil. I have discussed it at length in 
Luciano Floridi, and Jeff Sanders. Artificial Evil and the Foundation of Computer Ethics. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 3(1): 55-66, 2001 . 
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Good Will can only blame herself, for had she been better informed, evil might have 
been avoidable. The tragedy of her inability is also the scandal of her annihilation as a 
moral agent.  
ICT erode the scope of natural evil, re-cataloguing it as moral, or, as André Gide 
once put it, “man’s responsibility increases as that of the gods decreases” and ICT play 
a major role in this shifting process. Not that the process itself is either new or limited to 
ICT. Already Homer could write “Look you now, how ready mortals are to blame the 
gods. It is from us, they say, that evils come, but they even of themselves, through their 
own blind folly, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained.” (Odyssey, I.30-35). But 
ICT have made the process snowball.  
 On the other hand, if ICT have increased by orders of magnitude a Good Will’s 
capacity to cope with the world, they have also submerged her with information about 
the endless evils that she should be worried about. This is Cassandra’s predicament, 
which I suggest may be labelled, to differentiate it from the IT-heodicean problem, the 
tragedy of the Good Will.  
 
 14
The Tragedy of the Good Will 
Good Wills are regularly submerged and often overwhelmed by information about evils 
in the world that they are unable to prevent, defuse, control or eradicate. In the past, less 
information meant less responsibility. Nowadays, ICT keep inundating the Good Wills 
with distressing news about famine, diseases, wars, violence, corruption, injustices, 
environmental disasters, poverty, lack of education, racism and so forth, on a daily 
basis. The list is endless, the disasters hearth-breaking, the responsibilities mounting, 
the sense of scandalous powerlessness nauseating. Confronted by so much information 
about so many moral failures, the Good Will cannot help feeling frustrated, aggrieved 
and guilty. A concrete example will render the analysis less academic and ivory-tower. 
It concerns the sea again. 
On 14 August 2003, The Economist published an article (“The next big wave”), 
in which one could read that “[in the western Pacific] […]. Since 1990, ten big tsunamis 
have claimed more than 4,000 lives. So it would be nice to be able to detect such 
tsunamis far enough in advance for people to be evacuated. […] What is needed are 
specific detectors that take advantage of the fact that tsunamis are felt throughout the 
ocean's depths, unlike wind-generated waves, which affect only its surface.” The article 
carried on to discuss several technologies and techniques for detecting, analysing, 
classifying and predicting tsunamis. It concluded: “Technology, though, can do only so 
much. […] Coastal dwellers must be able to recognize the signs of a possible tsunami – 
such as strong, prolonged ground shaking – and seek higher ground at once. As with 
any hazard, the more informed the public are, the better their chances of survival.”  
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Despite all this information, on 26 December 2004, the Sumatra-Andaman 
earthquake caused a series of devastating tsunamis that spread throughout the Indian 
Ocean, killing approximately a quarter of a million people, with thousands of others 
missing. No ICT (tsunami warning systems) were in place to mitigate the impact of the 
catastrophe. It was one of the deadliest disasters in modern history. On the other hand, 
thanks to ICT, Good Wills everywhere in the world “suffered with those whom they 
saw suffer”, almost in real time. Morally speaking, it was an instance of the tragedy of 
the Good Will. 
 It would be easy to speculate about future disasters that will be equally tragic 
and scandalous in the technical sense of the words specified above. Think of global 
warming, nuclear proliferation, the Palestinian problem, or AIDS in Africa, for 
example. But the point should be sufficiently clear to require no further illustration. 
Instead, one aspect that is worth emphasising here is how the Good Will might be 
inclined to develop skilful forms of ignorance or blind spots. As Plato remarks in the 
Republic (478c), the soul might decide not to pursue nous (knowledge and 
understanding) but agnoia (ignorance and irrationality), and dwell in “that which is not 
(at all)”, entropy, in the vocabulary I introduced some time ago. Let me explain.  
If the analysis offered so far is even roughly correct, a Good Will will feel pain 
and frustration when informed about evil events, and the more so the more she is 
informed about dramatic events with respect to which she is powerless. But it is also 
reasonable to assume that no Good Will will be inclined to leave open such a 
perennially bleeding wound. If one suffers too much with those whom one sees suffer, 
one may soon wish to avert one’s eyes. So the risk that the Good Will constantly runs is 
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that of unwittingly (when not consciously) and innocently trying to avoid her 
Cassandra-like predicament by shutting herself off in her own informational niche. The 
dialectic is simple, and well captured by two well-worn phrases: since “what the eye 
does not see, the heart cannot grieve”, the Good Will is constantly tempted to “bury her 
head in the sand”. ICT have made the need for such hiding more strongly and widely 
felt, insofar as they have increased the potential exposure of the Good Will to evil.  
The result, once again, is well epitomized in our digital age by the phenomenon 
of the so-called The Daily Me. The term, coined by Negroponte10 some time ago, refers 
now to any news system (including news feeds) tailored to, customized by, or 
personalized for the reader’s interests and tastes. The problem with The Daily Me is that 
it can easily become a mere mirror of one’s own idiosyncratic biases, thus contributing 
to what David Weinberger has called the “echo chamber”, information spaces where 
like-minded people unwittingly (and this is the risk) communicate only with people who 
already agree with them, reinforcing and never really challenging their belief systems.11
This filtering phenomenon, however, is not new. On the contrary, it might help 
to explain, for example, why the Germans managed to organize the concentration camps 
(recall: no Good Will no tragedy) while largely failing to grasp the horror of the 
Holocaust in all its magnitude (the agnostic Good Will).12 What I am suggesting here is 
not that the Germans did not know at all, or that there was insufficient information 
                                                 
10 Nicholas Negroponte. Being Digital. Knopf: Distributed by Random House New York, 1995. 
11 For a critical discussion of The Daily Me effects see Cass R. Sunstein. Republic.Com. Princeton 
University Press Princeton, N.J., 2001. 
12 The issue of how much the German population knew about the Holocaust is still debated. Robert 
Gellately. Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press Oxford, 
2001. has provided mass media evidence in favour of the hypothesi that Germans knew quite a lot about 
the Holocaust, but it seems that what the research shows, rather, is that they could have known quite a lot, 
had they wished to know it. 
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available to anyone who cared to check it, but that many Germans, confronted by such 
horrors and by the costly consequences of any disagreement with the Nazi regime, 
preferred not to see what was happening. As Dahrendorf wrote “It is certainly true that 
most Germans ‘did not know’ about National Socialist crimes of violence; nothing 
precise, that is, because they did not ask any questions.”13 Not asking questions, not 
seeing, not believing what one hears, filtering and rationalising evil: this is the common 
trap into which weak (see the comment above about akrasia) Good Wills tend to fall. 
No one is less informed than the person who does not want to be informed. 
Paradoxically, Good Wills may therefore be the worst witnesses, the more so the 
more they are morally good and hence sensitive to evil.14 As a consequence, Good 
Wills may have to be forced to keep their eyes open in front of the horrors that are being 
committed in their backyards. This might seem almost a torture. It reminds one of the 
“Ludovico technique” in A Clockwork Orange (1971), the cult film directed and 
produced by Stanley Kubrick. There, the protagonist, Alex, is forced to keep his eyes 
mechanically and painfully wide-open, while being shown scenes of intense violence, 
cruelty, and social aberration, including The Triumph of the Will by Leni Riefenstahl, 
the infamous propaganda documentary about the 1934 Nazi Party Congress in 
Nuremberg. Alex is not a Good Will but a psychopath, who enjoys violence. His 
conditioning is supposed to rehabilitate him. In the case of the Good Will, the 
metaphorical “Ludovico technique” that should be applied by ICT has a different effect, 
                                                 
13 Ralf Dahrendorf. Society and Democracy in Germany. 1st ed. Doubleday Garden City, N.Y., 1967. 
14 Compare this to the conclusions reached by Pacuit, Parikh, and Cogan. The Logic of Knowledge Based 
Obligation. about the Kitty Genovese case: “In 1964, a young woman was stabbed to death while 38 
neighbours watched from their windows but did nothing. The reason was not indifference, but none of the 
neighbours had even a default obligation to act, even though, as a group, they did have an obligation to 
take some action to protect Kitty”. 
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for it is supposed to prevent her from burying her head in the sand of ignorance. It is 
one of the ethical tasks that a free press and uncensored ICT should have in any decent 
democracy. 
 
Escaping the Tragic Condition 
There may be plenty of reasons for being pessimistic about the tragedy of the Good 
Will, not least historical records. Perhaps information about preventable or solvable 
evils will keep pouring in, and we will forever be unable to do anything about it. One 
good thing about such pessimism, however, is that, if correct, it would require no action 
and Lucretius’ attitude might be the only serious alternative. In contrast, if some 
optimism is even partially justified, the bad news is that this is cause for further toil, and 
not just pragmatically, but also theoretically. For more discussion of the possible 
strategies available to escape the tragic becomes indispensable. In this section, I hope to 
make a first step in such a direction. 
There seem to be four main ways in which the tragedy of the Good Will might be 
escaped. Luckily, they are mutually compatible and hence possibly synergetic. Before 
discussing them, let me briefly outline them here: 
1. the information/power gap may decrease, as information has already reached its 
peak, whereas power is catching up; 
2. from quantity to quality of information: better informed Good Wills can act and 
exercise their augmented power better;  
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3. from the powerless observation of the single Good Will to the empowered 
interactions of multiagent systems of Good Wills: global problems and 
distributed morality require global agents; 
4. the ontological side of information: the need for an augmented ethics. 
Each strategy requires some comments. 
 
1) More power. To begin with, although ICT and the corresponding amount of available 
information have seen an extraordinary development in the last half century, Good 
Wills have also witnessed a steady increase in their powers. For a rough estimate, one 
may adopt a brute translation into dollars per person. According to the World Bank, the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty (less than $1 a day) in developing 
countries dropped by almost half between 1981 and 2001, from 40 to 21 percent of the 
global population (23 April, 2004). Again in 2004, the Bank’s annual statistical report 
showed a drop in the absolute number of people living on less than $1 a day in all 
developing countries from 1.5 billion in 1981, to 1.1 billion in 2001, with much of the 
progress occurring in the 1980s. Of course, these are merely quantitative measures, but 
they do provide some ground for cautious optimism. Good Wills might be able to put 
ever more dollars where the bad news events conveyed by their ICT occur, thus helping 
to restore some balance between information and power. 
 
2) Better information. The second way of tackling the tragedy of the Good Will is by 
using the same ICT, which can bring so much information about the evils in the world, 
to empower the individual Good Will. This is not a simple matter of more or less 
 20
information. Depending on contexts and usage, more information might be a benefit 
(more control, more competition, more choice and less censorship) or a curse, since 
sometimes less information might be preferable (more fairness and less bias, more 
privacy, more security). Too often these issues are left unqualified (what information?), 
and uncircumstantiated (information for whom? under which conditions? for what 
purpose?). Rather, empowering the single Good Will seems to be a matter of more 
“quality information”, in the sense that future ICT should provide her with more 
feedback (whether and how the single agent’s efforts and resources are affecting 
reality), more transparency (information constrains other agents’ misbehaviour, as speed 
camera show), more forecasting (information is prevention) and more engineering 
(information as building capability).  
 
3) Global agents. The careful reader might have noticed a tension between, on the one 
hand, the IT-heodicean problem and Oedipus’ predicament (sufficient power, 
insufficient information) and, on the other hand, the tragedy of the Good Will and 
Cassandra’s predicament (sufficient information, insufficient power). How is it possible 
that ICT can generate both predicaments? If they are empowering both pragmatically 
and informationally, surely these are two sides of the same coin, so their effects should 
overlap and cancel each other out, at least to a large degree. Make Oedipus and 
Cassandra work together, as it were, and it won’t be necessary to escape the tragic 
condition because none will arise in the first place.  
The tension is indeed there, but the inference drawn from it is mistaken, for it is 
based on a confusion of levels of agenthood. The IT-heodicean problem affects the 
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Good Will in so far as the latter refers to supra-individual agents. In this sense, it is 
ultimately humanity that is empowered by ICT. For example, none of us individually 
could have done anything to prevent the Sumatra-Andaman devastating tsunamis, but 
humanity as a whole could and should. The tragedy of the Good Will, on the other hand, 
affects single individual agents: it is you and I, John and Mary, Peter and Jenny who are 
subject by ICT to the dialectic of being informed about evils against which we are 
largely unable to do anything of comparable magnitude. It is us individually who give 
scandal. 
It follows that the third strategy consists in identifying this mismatch and re-
aligning individual and global agents, in order to make sure that the latter inherit the 
eudokia of the former and act on it. It might be easier to overcome both the IT-
heodicean problem and the tragedy of the Good Will if we could work on developing 
global artificial agents – i.e., non-human (engineered) and/or social (e.g. groups, 
organizations, institutions), global agents – capable of channelling and guiding the 
energies of the single Good Wills who constitute them. National states, NGOs, 
international organizations or multinational companies are just some examples of this 
sort of supra-individual, global, artificial agents that are hybrids of other artificial agents 
(imagine the member states of the EU, or the software and hardware systems that 
contribute to the existence of a company) and individual people. This general strategy 
calls for more conceptual analysis, in order that we might understand artificial agents 
better, and clear outlines about how moral artificial agents may be built, morally 
educated or trained, and controlled. 
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4) Augmented ethics not super-ethics. It might be felt that the impact of ICT on our 
lives could be entirely reduced to a matter of DUMB effects: Doing & Understanding 
More & Better. If this were the case, then DUMB effects would transform man (the 
supra-individual Good Will) into superman. Superman has super-responsibilities and so 
ICT would require a super-ethics. The problem would then be that any super-ethics 
would be, for each of us single human agents, supererogatory, as it would require super-
heroes. The mistake, in this case, is to confuse not only the level of agenthood, but also 
the scope of the impact of ICT. ICT are not just a matter of DUMB effects. New or 
digital ICT re-ontologize15 the very nature of the infosphere, that is, of the environment 
itself, of the agents embedded in it and of their interactions. Since they also have an 
essentially ontic impact, they radically transform old realities and create entirely new 
ones. And because of their ontic impact, ICT require an augmented ethics for the whole 
of humanity as the ultimate Good Will, not for individual super-heroes. It follows that 
nowadays the IT-heodicean problem and the tragedy of the Good Will call for an ethics 
of creators (demiurges, as in Plato’s Timaeus) and not of mere end-users of reality.16 Or, 
to put it slightly differently, since the Good Will is increasingly morally responsible for 
designing and implementing the world the way it is, the moral question concerning her 
responsibilities is as much ethical as ontological, namely how she (both as an individual 
and as a supra-individual or global agent) could act as a morally good demiurge. It 
seems that her augmented responsibilities require an ecological approach to the whole 
reality. 
 
                                                 
15 The neologism is constructed following the word “re-engineering” (“to design and construct anew”). 
16 Luciano Floridi, and Jeff Sanders. Internet Ethics: The Constructionist Values of Homo Poieticus. In 
Robert Cavalier, editors, The Impact of the Internet on Our Moral Lives. SUNY, New York, 2005. 
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Conclusion: Towards a Global Consensus? 
By way of conclusion, I would like to point to a specific case in which some of the 
previous suggestions seem to have found a first application. This is the Copenhagen 
Consensus, a project conceived and organized by Bjørn Lomborg 
(http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/). 
What would be the best ways to spend additional resources on helping the 
developing countries? Resources are scarce, and their allocation is therefore a specific 
case of triage, which demands difficult choices among good projects. In 2004, the 
Copenhagen Consensus project attempted to set priorities among a range of suggestions 
on how to improve standards of life in developing countries on the basis of a cost-
benefit analysis. Eight economists, including four Nobel laureates, met on 24-28 May, 
2004 at a roundtable in Copenhagen, and produced a ranking, based on applied welfare 
economics, of the 30-50 identified opportunities on which $50 billion of new money for 
development initiatives might be best spent. Ten global challenges were chosen: civil 
conflicts, climate change, communicable diseases, education, financial stability, 
governance, hunger and malnutrition, migration, trade reform, water and sanitation. 
With something close to unanimity, the panel put measures to restrict the spread of 
HIV/AIDS at the top of the ranking. It also rated all four top proposals “very good”, as 
measured by the ratio of social benefit to cost. The bottom of the list, however, aroused 
more controversy. All three of the schemes proposed to the panel for mitigating climate 
change (including the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse-gas emissions) were rated “bad”, 
meaning that their costs were estimated to exceed their benefits. The panel may meet 
again in 2008 for a second round. 
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Regardless of whether one shares the conclusions of the panellists, several 
aspects of the Copenhagen consensus resonate positively with the analysis developed in 
this paper. 
First, the Copenhagen Consensus itself should be interpreted as a supra-
individual Good Will, that is, as a multiagent system constituted by individuals, 
institutions and communication systems satisfying those conditions laid down in the 
second section of this article (“six assumptions”).  
Second, the Good Will gave priority to information above any other 
consideration, including politics and religion. Of all the problems tackled, it was clear 
that the most pressing was to have some reliable information on which problems to 
tackle first. An ethics of information was the stage against which the decisional 
procedure took place.  
Third, the Copenhagen Consensus clearly meant to offer a series of strategies to 
other global Good Wills (again, understood as supra-individual agents) while at the 
same time informing individual Good Wills (the public) about what it considered to be 
the most economically fruitful and morally justifiable approach to global challenges. So 
there was no confusion in levels of agenthood, while the needs of both individual and 
global agents were addressed.  
Fourth, despite appearances, the Consensus adopted a strongly ecological 
approach: it was clear that it wished to provide a balanced assessment of how limited 
resources could be best employed to improve the world. That some solutions to solve 
environmental problems were deemed to be unsatisfactory said nothing about the 
importance of the issues they were addressing.  
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Fifth, in a way that complements the previous remark about ecologism, the 
Consensus was an explicit attempt to develop a demiurgic approach to global issues. 
One of the assumptions behind the Copenhagen exercise is that the world will change 
according to human initiatives and that sorting them out and prioritising them is of vital 
importance.  
Last, but equally importantly, since its beginning the Copenhagen Consensus 
project has itself been subjected to open discussion and made the subject of that flow of 
information that ICT have taught us to take for granted.  
In a phrase, it was information about information, or an open and rational 
process of discussion about what needs to be done first.17 There seem to be few better 
ways of dealing with the world’s most serious problems.  
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